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COMMENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF PRENATAL
WRONGFUL DEATH
Recovery for wrongful death arising from injuries received prior to
birth has been a subject of recent controversy in the courts. Originally waged
over the basic issue of prenatal injury, the discussion now centers over the
subordinate questions of prenatal wrongful death, i.e., whether a cause of
action should be allowed for the wrongful death of an unborn foetus; and
viability,' i.e., whether viability at the time of injury should be a prerequisite
for recovery for prenatal injury and/or prenatal death. The purpose of this
Comment is to explore the area of prenatal wrongful death, touching upon its
historical development as it bears on the present state of the law and its
2
probable future course.
4
8
Two recent Pennsylvania cases, Gullborg v. Rizzo and Carrollv. Skloff,
present opposing views on the question of prenatal wrongful death recovery
and illiustrate the unsettled state of the present law.
Gullborg v. Rizzo arose out of an automobile collision which caused the
stillbirth of the Gullborg foetus, a viable, fully formed female of seven months'
development, riding en ventre sa mere. The father, as administrator of the
5
foetus' estate, sought recovery under the Pennsylvania wrongful death and
survival 6 statutes. In affirming recovery for the plaintiff, the circuit court of
appeals held that Pennsylvania law permitted recovery for the wrongfully
caused death of a viable, unborn foetus.
Carroll v. Skloff presents a substantially different factual situation. Defendant, a physician, in the course of an operation upon the decedent's mother
which required cutting the uterus, discovered a foetus of ten weeks gestation.
Defendant surgically removed the foetus thereby causing its death. The
father, acting as administrator for the estate of the stillborn foetus, brought
survival and wrongful death actions. As in Gullborg, the Carroll foetus was
alleged to be viable, although here it is not certain whether the court accepted
1. A viable foetus is one which has attained such form and development of organs
as to be normally capable of living outside the uterus. See WFBsTER, THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2548 (1963); see also viability, 2 BouviR, LAW DICrIONARY 3399
(8th ed. 1914).
2.

See generally Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MICH. L.

3. 331 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1964).
4. 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964).
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1601, 1602 (1953).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 320.601--03 (1950).
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COMMENT
the allegation. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied recovery for prenatal
death as a matter of law.
The gap between Carroll and Gullborg reflects the judicial uncertainty
which has attended the development of prenatal injury law. The earliest leading American case, Dietrich v. Northampton,7 involved an infant who died
shortly after birth because of prenatal injuries. The court, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Holmes, denied recovery on the theory that the foetus
constituted a part of the mother and was not a separate being in its own
right. Therefore, any injury suffered by the foetus was actually an injury to
the mother for which she could maintain a cause of action. The law retained
this concept of foetal development long after it was discarded by the medical
profession, using it as a ground for denying recovery for prenatal injury.8
As time weakened the logic of Dietrich, courts frequently employed the following arguments to bolster their position: (1) lack of precedent (2) stare
decisis (3) lack of duty to the foetus, since it was a part of the mother and
not a person itself (4) fear of injustice arising from difficulty of proof and
(5) fear of fictitious claims.9
In 1946, however, Bonbrest v. Kotz10 repudiated the doctrine of Dietrich
as being contrary to natural justice and modern medical knowledge. Bonbrest
held that there was a cause of action for prenatal injury if the foetus was viable
at the time of the injury. Since 1946 the rule of Bonbrest v. Kotz has virtually replaced the Dietrich doctrine." As the basic question of recovery for
prenatal injury was resolved, the issues of viability and prenatal wrongful
death came to the fore.
A survey of the various jurisdictions does not disclose a satisfactory explanation for the allowance of prenatal wrongful death recovery. Although
ten jurisdictions have permitted actions for prenatal wrongful death, 12 none
7. 52 Am. Rep. 242 (Mass. 1884).
8. See Note, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 554, 564 & n.65 (1962) referring to the biological
concept only with regard to liability.
9. Note, 38 WASH. L. REv. 390, 393 (1963).
10. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
11. See PROSsmR, TORTS § 56 (3d ed. 1964).
12. Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42, (S.C. 1964); Odham v. Sherman, 243 Md.
179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964) ; Gorke v. LeClerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d 448 (1962) ;
Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App.
431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959) ; Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957),
rule modified as to viability by Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958) ;
Worgan v. Greggo, 128 A.2d 556 (Del. 1956); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901
(Ky. 1955) ; Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So.2d 434 (1954) ; Verkennes v. Corneia,
229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949). These cases should be distinguished from decisions
where death actions were allowed for infants who have been primarily injured and have
died subsequent to birth. In such cases, the court in essence is merely recognizing a cause
of action for prenatal injury. Cf. Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960) ;
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of the cases offer a compelling argument in favor of recovery. The leading
case, Verkennes v. Corniea,'3 recognized a cause of action for the stillbirth
of a viable foetus. However, the opinion dwelt almost exclusively on the subject of prenatal injury. Since no distinction was made between prenatal death
and prenatal injury, the implication is that the court equated the two. Five of
the ten jurisdictions permitting the action for wrongful death cite Verkennes
as controlling. Moreover, none of these jurisdictions had previously recognized a right of recovery for prenatal injury. It is submitted that this propensity to discuss the death issue in terms of prenatal injury may reflect the
courts' desire to disassociate themselves from the unpopular and crumbling
rule of Dietrich v. Northampton. The courts may have merely utilized the
factual situation of prenatal death as a vehicle to join the growing trend in
support of recovery for prenatal injuries.
Three of the four remaining jurisdictions which had previously permitted actions for prenatal injury, also followed the general rationale of
Verkennes v. Corniea. These courts, however, relied primarily on prenatal
1 4
injury cases which had been decided within their respective jurisdictions.
The tenth jurisdiction, Connecticut, in Gorke v. LeClerc,1" recognized the
death action on the theory that it was unjust to permit recovery where the
infant survives for only a few minutes and deny recovery where the infant
dies just before birth. In essence, Gorke ruled that birth is an arbitrary and
inappropriate limitation upon the right to recovery. 16
Seven jurisdictions, excluding Pennsylvania, have denied actions for
prenatal death. 17 Two cases, Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co.' 8 and Howell v.
Amann v. Faidy, 415 l1. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953) ; Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St.
529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950).
13. 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949). See Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 634 (1949).
14. See Fowler v. Woodward, 33 U.S.L. Week 2169 (S.C. 1964), citing Hall v.
Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960) ; Odham v. Sherman, 243 Md. 179, 198 A.2d
71 (1964), citing Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951) ; Stidam v.
Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959), citing Williams v. Marion Rapid
Transit Co., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
15. 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d 448 (1962).
16. Other cases occasionally cited in favor of recovery for prenatal wrongful death
are: Mace v. Young, 210 F. Supp. 706 (Alaska 1962) ; Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56
(Iowa 1960) ; Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955) ; Valence v.
Louisiana Power and Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. 1951).
17. See Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964) ; Hogan v. McDaniel,
204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958) ; Durrett v. Owens, 212 Tenn. 614, 371 S.W.2d
433 (1963) ; Muschetti v. Pfizer, 208 Misc. 870, 144 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1955) ; In re Logan's
Estate, 4 Misc.2d 283, 156 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1956), aff'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 842, 156 N.Y.S.2d
152 (1956), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 800, 166 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957); Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal.
App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954) ; Howell v. Rushing, 261 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1953) ; Drabbels
v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951) ; Keyes v. Construction Serv. Inc.,
340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960) (dicta) ; West v. McCoy, 233 S.C. 369, 105 S.E.2d
88 (1958), limited to non-viable foetuses by Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42 (S.C.
1964).
18. 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951).
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Rushing,19 followed the outmoded rule of Dietrich v. Northampton, holding
that the foetus constituted a part of the mother and therefore, had no separate
existence prior to birth. A third jurisdiction, Tennessee, in Hogan v. McDaniel,20 decided the case on grounds similar to Drabbels, but later modified
the rule by allowing recovery for prenatal injuries, 21 while retaining the rule
against actions for prenatal wrongful death.'
California, having previously permitted recovery for prenatal injury, 23
denied the death action on the grounds that a foetus was not a person within
the meaning of the wrongful death statute.2 4 Massachusetts, the jurisdiction
of Dietrich v. Northampton, has accepted the trend in favor of actions
for prenatal injuries in the case of Keyes v. Construction Service Co.25 In
dicta, however, the Massachusetts court specifically retained the rule against
recovery for prenatal wrongful death.
New York presents a situation similar to the present one in Pennsylvania. That jurisdiction, having permitted recovery for injuries to both
viable 26 and pre-viable 27 foetuses, nevertheless denied a cause of action for
prenatal wrongful death in the case of Muschetti v. Pfizer.2s The Muschetti
opinion offers scant support for the decision, merely stating that an infant
must be born alive in order for a cause of action to accrue. The seventh
29
jurisdiction, New Jersey, having also allowed recovery for prenatal injury,
30
has recently denied recovery for prenatal wrongful death.
In summary the decisions in favor of recovery are based primarily on
either the law of prenatal injury, or else the arbitrariness of birth as a limitation to liability. The cases denying recovery rely on Dietrich v. Northampton,
failure to meet statutory prerequisites, or sheer reluctance on the part of the
31
court to extend liability in the uncertain area of prenatal death.
19. 261 P.2d 178 (Okla. 1953).
20. 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958).
21. Shousha v. Matthews Drivurself Serv. Inc., 210 Tenn. 384, 358 S.W.2d 471
(1962).
22. Durrett v. Owens, 212 Tenn. 614, 371 S.W.2d 433 (1963).
23. Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App.2d 629, 92 P.2d 678, rehearing denied, 93 P.2d
562 (1939). Recovery was based on a statute recognizing the foetus as a person on the
condition it is later born alive.
24. See Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954).
25. 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960).
26. Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
27. Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696, appeal granted, 283
App. Div. 914, 129 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1954).
28. 208 Misc. 870, 144 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1955) ; In re Logan's Estate, 4 Misc.2d 283,
156 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1956), aff'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 842, 156 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1956), aff'd, 3
N.Y.2d 800, 166 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
29. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
30. Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964).
31.

Notable exceptions to this criticism are the excellent decisions of the New Jersey

Supreme Court in Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960), and Graf v.
Taggert, supra note 30.
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ANALYSIS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA VIEW

Carroll v. Skloff32 is the most recent decision in Pennsylvania on the
wrongful death issue. However, the contrary and virtually simultaneous case
of Gullborg v. Rizzo," gives rise to doubt as to the soundness and validity
of the Carroll decision. Moreover, evaluation of both cases is made difficult
by the brevity of the opinions.
Gullborg, the federal court case, is clear in its holding. Recovery may be
had under survival and wrongful death statutes for the wrongfully caused
stillbirth of a viable foetus. However, the reasoning by which the court reached
this conclusion is not clear. The opinion adhered substantially to the pattern
established in Verkennes, by dwelling heavily upon the topic of prenatal
injury; apparently assuming that the instance of prenatal death has no legal
significance distinguishable from the case where the injured foetus is born
alive. In the same vein the court attacks the long discarded rule of Dietrich v.
Northampton. Again failing to distinguish between prenatal injury and prenatal death, the court cites Bonbrest v. Kotz3 4 in support of its decision,
35
even though Bonbrest was specifically limited to infants born alive.
The Gullborg opinion then cites the Pennsylvania case of Sinkler v.
Kneale3 8 as support for the wrongful death action. In Sinkler a woman one
month pregnant was injured, causing the infant to be born mongoloid. The
court held that the non-viability of the foetus at the time of the accident
would not bar recovery for the prenatal injury.3 7 The primary significance of
the Sinkler decision is its recognition of the right to maintain an action for
prenatal injury and its simultaneous repudiation of the viability test in such
cases. The case itself bears no relation to the issue of prenatal death. Correctly
observing that Pennsylvania has in Sinkler v. Kneale assumed a liberal position
with regard to cases of prenatal injury, the Gullborg court transposes this
liberality into the area of prenatal wrongful death.38 This view completely disregards the common law origin of personal injury actions as opposed to the
statutory nature of survival and wrongful death actions.."
Surprisingly, Gullborg gave only minor attention to cases in other jurisdictions which have decided the issue of prenatal wrongful death. The court
32. 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964).
33. 331 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1964).
34. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. Cir. 1946). See also text accompanying notes 9 & 10
supra.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
Bennett,

65 F. Supp. at 142.
401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960).
Id. at 273, 164 A.2d at 96.
Gullborg v. Rizzo, 331 F.2d at 559.
Compare Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 142 (D.C. Cir. 1946) with Voelkel v.
115 F.2d 102, affirming, 31 F. Supp. 506 (3d Cir. 1940).

1965]

COMMENT

merely noted that the majority view permits recovery for the wrongful death
40
of a viable foetus.
Also in Gullborg, minimal consideration was given to the Pennsylvania
lower court decision of Carroll v. Skloff, for it was cited only in regard
to that court's interpretation of the viability rule. 4 1 The fact that the Pennsylvania lower court decided Carroll v. Skloff solely on the basis of viability
would no doubt lessen its impact upon Gullborg, since viability was not an
issue in the latter case.4 Nevertheless, Carroll was the Pennsylvania case
most similar to Gullborg and, consequently, it deserved, but did not receive,
extensive consideration by the Gullborg court.
In contrast to Gullborg, Carroll v. Skloff is complicated by the additional
issue of viability. 43 The court's failure to separate the issues of viability and
prenatal death, as well as the brevity of the opinion, have resulted in an ambiguous holding.
The common pleas court in Carroll held: first, that as a matter of law a
foetus of ten weeks gestation was not viable; and second, that this lack of
viability barred recovery under the wrongful death and survival statutes.
Plaintiff appealed both these holdings. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
while endorsing the lower court's opinion, avoided the question of viability
and seemed to decide the case on other grounds.
Briefly, the arguments set forth by the supreme court are: (1) the policy
considerations which support recovery for prenatal injury do not inhere in
an action for prenatal wrongful death; (2) the real beneficiaries under the
death action, the parents, may be adequately compensated under their own
independent actions ;44 and (3) an infant has no estate capable of bringing
45
an action until it is born alive.
Since the opinion makes no reference to the viability issue, it would
appear that Carrolldenies actions for prenatal death, regardless of the viability
or non-viability of the foetus. It is not certain, however, that this was the
intention of the court. There are at least three indications that the Carroll
rule was directed only to cases involving non-viable foetuses. One such indication is the supreme court's endorsement of the lower court's opinion. Secondly,
the Carroll court made no effort to repudiate the Gullborg rule permitting
40. 331 F.2d at 560.
41. Brief for Appellant and Record, pp. 12A-14A, Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47,
202 A.2d 9 (1964).
42. The Gullborg foetus was of seven months gestation, whereas the Carroll foetus
was of less than three months gestation. Viability is not generally acquired before the
sixth month of intrauterine life. 2 BouvIER, LAw DIcrIONARY 3399 (8th ed. 1914).
43. Ibid.
44. 415 Pa. at 49, 202 A.2d at 11.
45. Ibid.
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recovery where the stillborn foetus was viable. 46 Finally, Carroll claims to be
supported by the weight of authority. 47 It would seem that this statement is
either erroneous or else denotes the significance of non-viability in the court's
decision. If, as is apparently the case, the court accepted Carroll's allegation
of viability, then the court's claim is erroneous, because the majority view is
that recovery should be allowed for the death of a viable foetus. 48 Conversely,
if the court tacitly held the Carrollfoetus to be non-viable and denied recovery
for that reason, then its claim as to the weight of authority is correct. The
majority of jurisdictions clearly deny a cause of action where the stillborn
49
foetus was non-viable.
Thus, the law in Pennsylvania remains unsettled. Carroll v. Skloif, on
its face, appears to deny any action for prenatal wrongful death, in which
case Gullborg is effectively repudiated. If, however, the Carroll rule was
meant to be applied only in cases of non-viability, then the doctrine of Gullborg
v. Rizzo, allowing recovery for the stillbirth of a viable foetus, remains valid.50
A

CRITIQUE OF PRENATAL WRONGFUL

DEATH RECOVERY

It is submitted that the cases have incorrectly resolved the issue of prenatal wrongful death and therefore, a reappraisal of it is necessary. The
first step in such an appraisal would seem to be a separation of the concepts
of prenatal injury and prenatal wrongful death. Although the factual situations
which give rise to the respective actions are often similar, it does not necessarily follow that they should be equated. There are at least three areas where
prenatal death should be distinguished from prenatal injury.
First, it must be noted that cases of prenatal injury constitute a type
of common law personal injury action, whereas survival and wrongful death
actions are statutory creations. In determining liability in prenatal injury
cases, the courts are not bound by the limited scope of a specific statute. Moreover, they are free to take advantage of the common-law fiction that a foetus
may be regarded as a person whenever to do so will benefit the child later
born. 51 Survival and wrongful death actions, being creatures of statute present
46. Plaintiff cited Gullborg v. Rizzo in the lower court, but the case was rejected
as inapplicable because the Gullborg foetus was viable. See Brief for Appellant and Record,
pp. 17A-18A, Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964).
47. 415 Pa. at 50, 202 A.2d at 11.
48. See cases cited notes 11 & 15 supra.
49. Of the ten jurisdictions cited in note 11 supra, all except New Hampshire,
Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958), have either expressly or by
dictum limited recovery to situations involving a viable foetus.
50. In this event, it would seem there is a cause of action in Pennsylvania for the
stillbirth of a viable foetus, but not for the stillbirth of a non-viable foetus.
51. The law of property recognizes posthumous issue as persons capable of inheriting property. However, the inheritance is conditioned upon the subsequent live birth of

1965]

COMMENT

a different problem. 52 The question in the case of a stillborn foetus is whether
the foetus is a "person" within the meaning of a wrongful death and survival
statutes.6 8 It is a virtual certainty that foetuses were not intended to be covered
by the framers of the survival or wrongful death statutes, since at the time of
their enactment foetuses were nowhere considered complete legal persons.
The Bonbrest line of cases, cited by the proponents of the death action, are
inapplicable to the issue of prenatal death, for they don't raise the status of
a foetus to that of a legal person. Indeed, to do so would cause far flung re54
percussions in areas of law utterly remote to the subject of prenatal injury.
Rather, the Bonbrest line of cases is directed and limited to the issue of prenatal injury. It is not suggested that the wording of the death statutes presents
an insurmountable barrier to recovery. However, the existence of the death
statutes serves to indicate that a prenatal wrongful death action is not merely
a manifestation of prenatal injury actions and requires consideration as an independent action apart from the law of prenatal injury.
A second area of substantial difference between prenatal injury and
wrongful death actions is the beneficiary, or person to be compensated. In the
case of prenatal injury the beneficiary is the injured infant. The sheer injustice
perpetrated by not permitting recovery in such a case is the primary force
in support of prenatal injury actions. 55 In cases of prenatal death, however,
the parents rather than the foetus are the beneficiaries. Thus, the basic policy
underlying recovery for prenatal injury is lacking in the case of prenatal
death. The fact of prenatal death brings a different set of equities into play,
and demands a basis for liability other than that which supports an action
for prenatal injury.
Thirdly, prenatal injury and prenatal death are to be distinguished with
regard to proof of causation. Although difficulty of proof should not bar
litigation of an issue, it is well established that impossibility of proof is a bar to
litigation. Obviously there exists a grey area between the latter and the former
and difficulty or impossibility may beset both prenatal injury and prenatal
death cases. 56 Nevertheless, in the case of prenatal injury, the existence of
the foetus. If the foetus is never born alive, the property passes as if the foetus never
existed.
Likewise, criminal law recognizes the unborn foetus as an existing person.
52. See Voelkel v. Bennett, 115 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1940).
53. See Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. at 49, 202 A.2d at 11.
54. See Odham v. Sherman, 243 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964), where the dissenting
opinion expresses the fear that the unborn foetus may be used as a conduit of property
to the parents.
A more absurd possibility is that a foetus, if recognized as a complete legal person,
might be claimed as a dependent under the federal income tax.
55. See 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS § 18.3 (1956).
56. PROSSER, TORTS § 56 at 355 (3d ed. 1964).
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specific, observable damage to the infant often facilitates proof. In many cases,
however, the exact cause of prenatal death remains subject to conjecture and
is often impossible to determine, especially in cases where the stillbirth occurs
early in pregnancy.5" Ultimately, difficulty of proof should not bar the wrongful death action, but the greater evidentiary difficulties encountered in wrongful
death weigh against the practice of analogizing prenatal death to prenatal
58
injury.
APPROPRIATENESS OF PRENATAL DEATH ACTIONS

Once freed from the control of prenatal injury law, the question remains
whether wrongful death and survival actions are appropriate to the instance
of prenatal death.
The survival action is strictly derivative in nature. It is, in essence, the
cause of action which the deceased might have brought if he had lived. This
cause of action is preserved by statute and passed on to the estate of the
deceased in the form of the survival action. 59 The measure of damages in
Pennsylvania, as in most jurisdictions, 60 is the injury to the decedent, or his
estate. This includes pain and suffering plus decedent's probable future earnings, less maintenance and expenses, all reduced to present value. 61 In the
case of a minor, or foetus, the probable future earnings are measured from
62
the age of twenty-one.
Wrongful death, while technically an independent action, is also generally
regarded as derivative.63 It is an action brought by the family or dependents
of the decedent to recover the pecuniary loss suffered by them because of
the decedent's death. The measure of damages in the case of a minor or foetus
is the probable future earnings of the child up to the age of twenty-one, reduced to its present value.
Neither of these actions was originally intended to cover cases of prenatal death, and it is submitted that they are a demonstrably inappropriate
and ineffective means of dealing with such cases. The inapplicability of the
survival and wrongful death actions is evident in the area of proof and measurement of damages. In any death action the matter of damages involves a
certain amount of conjecture. The rule is that the jury may indulge in such
speculation where it is necessary and where there are sufficient facts to support
57. See Note, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 554 (1962).
58. See Odham v. Sherman, 243 Md. 179, 181, 198 A.2d 71, 73 (1964) ; Stidam v.
Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 432, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959).
59. See Voelkel v. Bennett, 115 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1940).
60. See PROssEa, TORTS § 120, 121 (3d ed. 1964).
61. See Voelkel v. Bennett, 115 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1940).
62. Ibid.
63. See Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964).
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speculation.6 4 Conversely, damages may not be assessed on the basis of sheer
speculation, devoid of factual substantiation. 65 In the case of prenatal death
there is virtually no competent means of measuring the probable future earnings of the foetus. None of the usual indicia such as mental and physical capabilities, personality traits, aptitudes and training of the wrongfully killed are
present. While it is true that the social position of the parents may constitute a
slight unit of measure, the probable future earnings of a stillborn foetus are
patently a matter of sheer speculation.
An objection, in the same vein, specifically applicable to the wrongful
death action is that it can hardly be seriously contended that the death of a
foetus represents any real pecuniary loss to the parents. There may have
been a time when the average child went to work as soon as he was able. That
day has passed. Today, the rearing of a child typically constitutes a great
pecuniary liability for the parents.
Some courts, realizing the inapplicability of the pecuniary loss concept
to cases involving infants, have developed the "investment" theory which
permits a parent to recover the amount of his investment in the child.6 6 One
wonders whether the "investment" rule would dictate that the parents of a
ten-year-old should receive roughly twice the compensation given the parents
of a five-year-old. In any event the "investment" rule is totally unsatisfactory
in the case of prenatal death, since the investment made by the parents prior
to birth is usually relatively small and bears no relation to the real injury
involved.
Prenatal death actions may also provide an opportunity for a double
recovery.6 7 In a hypothetical situation where an expectant mother is injured
and the accident also causes the stillbirth of the foetus, the mother will have
her own cause of action. Theoretically, she is not to be compensated for the
death of the foetus in this action. As a practical matter, however, it would
seem virtually impossible to remove the fact of the foetus' death from the
consideration of the jury. 68 Consequently, it seems probable that the mother's
judgment will contain compensation for the stillbirth. If she is then allowed
to bring a separate action for the wrongful death of the foetus, the result is
a double recovery. Moreover, if the mother fails in her action, she may still
bring the wrongful death action, forcing a readjudication of the same factual
situation before a new jury, and, in effect, forcing the defendant to defend
twice. One additional argument against actions for prenatal death is that,
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See Krasowski v. White Star Lines, 307 Pa. 470, 162 A. 200 (1932).
Cromley v. Speich, 19 F. Supp. 857, aff'd, 94 F.2d 543 (D.C. 1942).
See 26-27 NAccA L. J. 206-210 (1960).
See PROSSER, TORTS § 56 (3d ed. 1964).
See 11 BELLI, TRIAL AND TORT TRENDS 574 (1961).
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despite medical advances, proof of causation remains difficult in most cases
and is often virtually impossible. 69
In support of prenatal death actions it is claimed that, since the difference
between a foetus and an infant may merely be a matter of hours, it is unjust
to deny recovery for the death of the former, while permitting an action for
the death of the latter.7 0 In short, it is claimed that birth is an arbitrary and
1
unreasonable limitation to liability. An illustrative case is Gorke v. LeClerC7
where the court, using the above rationale, substituted viability for birth as
a prerequisite for the death action. This argument has some merit, since the
birth limitation is concededly arbitrary to an extent and, therefore, will occasionally result in injustice. However, merely removing the birth limitation
does not solve the problem. Unless the courts are willing to extend recovery
from the time of conception, there remains the matter of choosing a standard
to replace birth. To date, it has not been seriously proposed that liability be
imposed from the time of conception; in fact, no court has recognized the
death action for a non-viable foetus. 72 It would appear, therefore, that viability
is the most probable replacement for the birth limitation. Is this an improvement? It is submitted that the viability test is no less arbitrary than the birth
standard. The sole difference between viability and non-viability is merely a
matter of time. Consequently, the injustice will not be removed, merely relocated. Moreover, the viability test is uniformly criticized by writers as being
unworkable, 73 for the time at which a pre-viable foetus becomes viable is indefinite and therefore, incapable of precise determination. 74 Thus, since any
limitation will be arbitrary in nature, a tangible and concrete event would be
the most acceptable and workable boundary. Birth, being a definite, observable
75
and significant event, meets this requirement.
69. See PROSSER, TORTS § 56, at 355 (3d ed. 1964) ; Note, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 554
(1962).
70. See Groke v. LeClerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d 448 (1962).
71. Ibid.
72. But see Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955). Recovery in this
case was based upon a criminal statute. In Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d
108 (1958), the court abrogated the viability test for prenatal injury cases and may have
intended to include cases of prenatal death.
73. See PROSSER, TORTS § 56, at 356 (3d ed. 1964) ; Note, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 554
(1962).
74. See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 73, at 356.
75. In the area of prenatal injury where many of the prenatal death issues are not
present, six jurisdictions have eliminated the viability test. It is noteworthy that three
of these six, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and New York, have nevertheless, denied any
recovery for prenatal death. See Sana v. Brown, 35 Ill. App. 2d 425, 183 N.E.2d 187
(1962) ; Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960) ; Smith v. Brennan, 31
N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960) ; Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958) ;
Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956) ; Kelly v.
Gregory, 282 App. Div 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953), appeal granted, 283 App. Div. 914,
129 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1954).
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COMMENT

The viability question may be of particular significance in Pennsylvania.
In Sinkler v. Kneale,7 6 Pennsylvania discarded the viability test in cases of
prenatal injury. Therefore, if Pennsylvania allows the prenatal wrongful death
action, it should logically permit recovery regardless of viability. To do so,
however, would place Pennsylvania in a position other jurisdictions have
carefully avoided.7 7 All courts have either held or specifically stated in dicta
7s
that the death action was to be limited to cases involving viable foetuses.
On the other hand, if Pennsylvania follows the majority and accepts the
prenatal wrongful death action along with the viability test, the result will
either negate the progress made in Sinkler v. Kneale, or else establish an
anomalous double standard. It is suggested that anticipation of this dilemma
may have influenced the court to deny recovery in Carroll v. Skloff.
RECOVERY FOR MENTAL DISTRESS

If death actions are, as suggested, inappropriate to the circumstance of
prenatal death, the issue next raised is whether there is any compensable
injury suffered in the wrongfully caused death of a foetus. As in the case
of prenatal injury, common sense and natural justice here dictate an affirmative answer. The basic flaw in the death actions is that they simply do not
touch the injury incurred. It is submitted that the injury which results from
prenatal death is not pecuniary loss, but rather the fear, anxiety and sorrow
suffered by the parents. The compensable injury is mental distress. At least
one case, Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.79 has recognized this to
be the primary injury and has permitted the mother to recover for the mental
distress caused by the stillbirth of her foetus.
THOMAS L. WENGER

76. 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960).
77. Courts have refused recovery for the wrongful death of pre-viable foetuses.
See cases cited note 73 supra.
78. Of the ten jurisdictions allowing recovery for prenatal wrongful death, all have
either expressly or impliedly limited recovery to cases involving viable foetuses. A possible exception is the New Hampshire case, Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d
108 (1958), expanding the rule of Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 109, 135 A.2d 249
(1957) ; see also note 70 supra and cases cited note 11 supra.
79. 50 So. 2d 847 (La. 1951).

